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Cheating in the Workplace: An Experimental Study of the 
Impact of Bonuses and Productivity* 
 
We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker 
productivity interact with workplace cheating. Firms often use bonus-based compensation 
plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable 
uncertainty in how much workers are paid. Exposing workers to a compensation scheme 
based on random bonuses makes them cheat more but has no effect on their productivity. 
We also find that more productive workers behave more dishonestly. We explain how these 
results suggest that workers’ cheating behavior responds to the perceived fairness of their 
employer’s compensation scheme. 
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1 Introduction
A vast body of evidence shows that cheating, fraud and crime are pervasive in the workplace.1 In
this paper, we investigate how pay structures and worker productivity interact with workplace
cheating. We focus on two specic questions. First, how does the uncertainty inherent in bonus-
based compensation schemes inuence the amount of employee dishonesty? Second, is there a
link between workers' productivity and how much they cheat?
1.1 Summary of experimental design and ndings
To study these questions, we conducted an online experiment using the computerized real-eort
`slider task' (Gill and Prowse, 2012) that involves moving sliders across a screen. To start with,
subjects were paid to complete a certain amount of the task. In the control, the subjects were
paid a xed amount, either $2 or $8, for completing the work. In the bonus treatment, subjects
were paid $2 for sure for completing the work, but with 50% probability were also paid a bonus
of an additional $6. Notice that the two-point distribution of remuneration was therefore held
constant across the control and the bonus treatment. In a subsequent stage, all subjects worked
under a common piece rate, and simultaneously were given an opportunity to cheat: we asked
the subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's phone number and paid them an
amount in pounds equal to the number that they reported. The design allows us to identify the
causal eect of the random component of bonuses on later cheating and productivity, and also
to determine whether there is a relationship between working harder and cheating more. The
experimental nature of our design gives us the control necessary to identify cleanly causal eects
and to measure accurately changes in productivity and cheating.
We nd three main results. First, the use of random bonuses increases cheating but has
no eect on productivity. Subjects who have been exposed to the bonus-based compensation
scheme are more likely to behave dishonestly by inating the number that they report: using
random bonuses increases the average report by 5% and increases the proportion of subjects
reporting a 7 or higher by 9%. This result suggests that the uncertainty inherent in bonus-based
compensation may have important unintended side eects that rms ought to take into account
when designing their human resource policies. Second, receiving a random bonus has no eect
on cheating or productivity: within the subjects exposed to bonus-based system, those who
received the bonus cheat to the same extent and work as hard as those subjects who did not
receive the bonus. Third, across our whole sample more productive subjects also cheat more:
our regression results indicate that the hardest-working subjects report a number 22% higher
than that reported by the least hard-working, while the most productive are 43% more likely to
report a 7 or higher. Although not the main focus of our paper, we also nd that males cheat
more: on average males report a number 7% higher than that reported by females.2
1We survey some of the evidence in Section 1.2.
2Dreber and Johannesson (2008), Conrads et al. (2011) and Houser et al. (2011) also nd that males behave
more dishonestly.
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1.2 Relevance of our set-up to labor markets
Our set-up is relevant to labor markets for three main reasons: rst, workers have many oppor-
tunities to cheat their employers; second, our methodology for measuring cheating allows what
we call `soft' as well as `hard' cheating, both of which are important in labor markets; and third,
rms commonly use bonus-based compensation that involves an important random component.
First, employee cheating and crime is an enormous and pervasive problem for rms and the
economy. The Association of Certied Examiners estimates that the typical rm loses about 5%
of revenues to occupational fraud, which translates into a loss of $3.5 trillion at the global level
(ACFE, 2012). Dickens et al. (1989) survey the evidence, reporting that 5% to 30% of business
failures in the US result from the cost of employee theft, while nding \overwhelming empirical
evidence that rms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance." Jacob
and Levitt (2003) nd evidence of teachers cheating on standardized test scores in about 5% of
classrooms annually. Employees can cheat their employers in a wide variety of ways. Grover
(1993) summarizes many of the ways in which employees can lie in their reports (self-reporting
of hours worked, for instance, is common in professional services such as auditing, consultancy
and the law).3 Other forms of cheating include: payroll fraud; falsifying revenue gures; false
or inated invoicing; false expense claims; cash skimming; check tampering; theft of inventory
or telephone services; customer identity theft; and theft of intellectual property.
Second, our methodology for measuring cheating provides an opportunity for what we call
`soft' and `hard' cheating. By hard cheating we mean a subject who cheats knowingly, that
is a subject who either (i) knows the last digit of her best friend's phone number but reports
something higher or (ii) does not know the last digit but reports a number instead of selecting
\don't know".4 By soft cheating we mean a subject who subconsciously deceives herself in a
favorable way about either (i) the identity of her best friend or (ii) the last digit of her best
friend's phone number. The scope for soft cheating introduced by our novel design mimics the
many opportunities for soft cheating and self-deception in the workplace that might impact the
employer. Workers can deceive themselves on a number of dimensions, including for example:
3\People have ample opportunity to either lie or tell the truth in the course of their work. Workers continually
report their behavior and give information to peers, superordinates, and others, in written form, orally, and
nonverbally. The truck driver records the number of hours on the road, the nurse charts vital signs, the certied
public accountant states what has been audited, and the forester reports a tree census. Organizations generally
rely on these reports to be honest. However, each of these individuals may have reasons to lie. The truck driver
returns home sooner if he says he drove the speed limit when in fact he exceeded it; the nurse may not have time
to actually observe vital signs that must be recorded; CPA's may gain partner status by exaggerating their work
quantity; and the forester may misreport the tree census to prevent deforestation." (Grover, 1993, p. 478)
4Our methodology for measuring cheating is related to a recent wave of experimental studies that use a report
of a privately-known outcome as an indicator of cheating or dishonesty. These papers use a `hard' form of cheating
or deception, where subjects report the outcome of a coin ip (Bucciol and Piovesan, 2011; Houser et al., 2011;
Abeler et al., 2012), a die roll (Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008; Lammers et al., 2010; Conrads et al., 2011; Fischbacher
and Utikal, 2011; Hao and Houser, 2011; Shalvi et al., 2011; Suri et al., 2011; Cojoc and Stoian, 2012; Lewis et al.,
2012; Shalvi et al., forthcoming) or some other random variable (Coricelli et al., 2010; Eisenkopf et al., 2011).
Some studies ask subjects to report their score on a task (e.g., Mazar et al., 2008; Cadsby et al., 2010; Schwieren
and Weichselbaumer, 2010). There is also a literature on strategic sender-receiver games in which a sender can
report the outcome of a random variable truthfully or lie (e.g., Charness and Garoupa, 2000; Lundquist et al.,
2009; Wang et al., 2010), and on lying in games more generally (e.g., Croson et al., 2003; Gneezy, 2005; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006).
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their personal contribution to team success (especially if they are a team leader deciding on
individual bonuses); their perception of the quality of junior colleagues (who might not be
promoted) or job candidates who might become future competitors (who might not be hired);
the extent to which double-billing of time can be justied in professions where clients are billed
for self-reported and unveriable hours; whether they are ill enough to justify taking a paid sick
day; and whether it is justied to take oce equipment for personal use and make personal
phone calls at work.
Third, rms often use bonus-based compensation plans that, from the perspective of the
worker, contain a component that is unrelated to individual performance, but instead depends
on factors that are beyond the worker's control { it is as good as random. Compensation based on
the performance of the entire rm or a subgroup of employees is one source of such uncertainty.
Examples include discretionary group bonuses, stock options and rm-wide prot-sharing plans.
The use of stock option plans for non-executive employees is widespread and growing (Core and
Guay, 2001), and non-executives receive over 60% of stock options granted by value (Oyer and
Schaefer, 2005). For executives, too, stock options are becoming a more important part of total
pay (Hall and Liebman, 1998), and even though CEOs impact rm performance directly, luck
also plays an important role in how they are paid.5 Group bonuses, where individuals share
a bonus based on their group's performance, are also common, especially in nancial services
(see Hansen, 1997, for a case study), and some successful rms make extensive use of prot-
sharing.6 Even when bonuses are based on individual performance, randomness can play an
important role due to measurement error when evaluating output, especially when evaluations
are subjective, and because the underlying process that translates worker input into measurable
output is stochastic.7 Winning a tournament is essentially equivalent to being paid a bonus,
and a large literature looks at the design of optimal tournaments in the presence of such noise
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
1.3 Novelty and interpretation of our results
Despite their importance, employee cheating and crime have not received much attention by
economists, and their determinants are not well understood. Our paper contributes to a small
yet growing literature that examines the interaction between various compensation schemes and
cheating in the workplace. Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) nd a positive
5Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) nd that CEO pay responds as much to luck, dened as observable shocks
to performance beyond the rm's control, as it does to performance that is under the rm's control, and that luck
aects salaries and bonuses as well as grants of stock options. One justication is that rms might want to link
CEO compensation to the value of outside opportunities (Oyer, 2004).
6Knez and Simester (2001) provide a brief survey and a case study of a Continental Airlines bonus scheme for
its 35,000 employees based on a rm-wide performance target; see also Bhattacherjee (2005) for a case study of a
bonus scheme based on a rm-wide productivity target for the 15,000 employees of the Indian rm ITC Limited
that makes up about 6% of pay on average.
7Moers (2005) uses administrative data to show how multiple performance measures and subjective evaluation
make it dicult to dierentiate among subordinates; see also Kaur et al. (2011, p. 29-30) for an interesting case
study of randomness due to variation in the quality of equipment in an Indian call center, but there are many
other sources of noise, e.g., luck in whether an important client signs a contract.
3
relationship between CEO compensation based on stock options and nancial misreporting.
Curry and Mongrain (2009) and Gilpatric (2011) study theoretically the incentives to cheat in a
rank-order tournament, where cheating increases both output and the probability of failing an
audit. Experimental subjects have been found to cheat more when competing (Schwieren and
Weichselbaumer, 2010) or when paid for reaching a target (Cadsby et al., 2010), compared to
when they are paid piece-rate; and subjects report higher die rolls when paid in teams of two
and share the proceeds (Conrads et al., 2011). Finally, Waller and Bishop (1990) and Chow
et al. (1994) consider experimentally how dierent pay schemes aect subordinate managers'
communication of private information. However, none of these papers examines the inuence
of bonuses on subsequent productivity and cheating behavior. Furthermore, to the best of our
knowledge we are the rst to analyze whether a link exists between productivity in a work task
and cheating behavior.8
A plausible interpretation of our nding that the level of cheating depends on whether sub-
jects were exposed to the bonus treatment, but not on whether they actually received the bonus,
is that subjects perceive exposure to the random bonus as unfair, but are not inuenced by out-
comes per se in their perceptions of fairness. Being subject to an unfair payment mechanism
provides a moral justication for negative reciprocity in the form of more dishonesty. This inter-
pretation is broadly consistent with existing notions of procedural fairness and with a compelling
body of evidence, from both laboratory experiments and eld data, that workers respond neg-
atively to unfair treatment and bad intentions. Under Trautmann (2009)'s concept of process
fairness, the outcome generating process rather than the actual outcomes inuences fairness
perceptions, while Konow (2003, p. 1230)'s survey notes that \some argue that procedural
justice is valued for itself, independent of outcomes." Charness and Levine (2007) nd experi-
mentally that worker punishment of an employer is much more sensitive to the component of
wages that is under their employer's control than it is to the component due to luck, concluding
that intentions matter much more than outcomes, while Houser et al. (2011) nd that cheating
following a dictator game is higher when recipients report that they have been treated unfairly,
but fail to uncover any link between income and cheating at a later stage. Evidence from the
eld also backs up the idea that fairness perceptions inuence employee cheating: Greenberg
(1990) nds that employee theft increases when a pay cut in manufacturing plants is perceived
as unfair; Nagin et al. (2002) nd that call center workers who feel well treated cheat their
employer less; while Chen and Sandino (forthcoming) nd that employee theft decreases when
wages rise relative to other comparable retail stores.9
Our result that more productive workers also cheat more might be viewed as surprising:
one might expect harder workers to be more honest as well. Indeed, Eisenberger and Shank
8In a setting where subjects were able to cheat to help them solve mazes and in reporting how many were
solved, Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010) nd that subjects who solved few mazes increased the amount
they cheated when they competed instead of being paid piece-rate, while those who solved many mazes did not.
There is also some evidence that student ability, as measured by SAT scores or grade point averages, is negatively
correlated with academic dishonesty (e.g., Abdolmohammadi and Baker, 2007).
9See also Evans III et al. (2001), Zhang (2008) and Matuszewski (2010) for a link between fairness and honesty
in managerial reporting.
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(1985) nd that subjects with a strong survey-measured work ethic resisted for longer before
taking an opportunity to cheat. On the other hand, people who are more strongly motivated
by money might work harder in order to earn more and be more inclined to take advantage
of opportunities to cheat for personal gain. Working hard on the real-eort task might also
deplete subjects' ability to withstand the temptation to cheat: Mead et al. (2009) and Gino
et al. (2011) nd that subjects whose self-control was depleted by being forced to undertake
an onerous task cheated more than subjects made to undertake a less onerous task. Another
possibility is that the subjects who worked harder felt that they deserved more for their labor.
If the piece-rate wage was felt to be insucient or unfairly low, this could have led to the more
productive subjects convincing themselves that more cheating was justied. Such perceptions
of unfairness would imply that low-wage or exploitative rms should be particulary wary of
fraudulent behavior from their higher-productivity workers.
1.4 Plan of the paper
Section 2 describes the experimental design. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and the re-
sults. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A provides the experimental instructions and Appendix B
provides robustness checks.
2 Experimental design
We ran an online experiment during a two-week period in May 2011. To recruit subjects we
sent email announcements to students at the University of Southampton. During the two-week
period, 641 subjects completed the experiment at a time and location of their choosing.10 The
experiment lasted 20 to 25 minutes and had to be completed in one go. The subjects were
informed that they would be paid $3 for completing the experiment, on top of any money
that they earned during the experiment (all payments were in pounds Sterling). The average
total payment to the subjects who completed the experiment was $19.32. At the end of the
experiment, we asked the subjects to report their gender. We paid the subjects privately in cash
on two pre-advertised dates. The experiment was implemented using the Django open-source
web application framework, which is written in Python. Appendix A provides the experimental
instructions.
2.1 The slider task
We used the computerized real-eort `slider task', which was rst developed by Gill and Prowse
(2012).11 The slider task consists of a screen displaying a large number of sliders (as described
10All those who expressed an interest were given log in details and were able to participate. 683 subjects logged
in, of which 42 failed to complete the experiment. Footnote 13 provides evidence that attrition was not related
to the allocation to the dierent experimental conditions.
11Gill and Prowse (2011b) provide details of how to implement the task, which has been used by Hetzel (2010),
Bonein and Denant-Boemont (2011), Cettolin and Riedl (2011), Eacret et al. (2011), Gill and Prowse (2011a),
Hammermann et al. (2011), Riener and Wiederhold (2011), Djawadi and Fahr (2012) and Monahan (2012).
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below, the number of sliders and the time allotted to the task varied across the stages of the
experiment). Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of a single slider. Each slider is initially
positioned at 0, as shown in Figure 1(a). By using her mouse or touchpad, the subject can
position each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100 inclusive.12 Each slider can be
readjusted an unlimited number of times during the time allotted to the task, and the current
position of each slider is displayed to the right of the slider. In this experiment, subjects received
2 points for each slider positioned at exactly 50 and 1 point for each slider positioned at exactly
49 or 51 (the points were deducted if a subject moved a slider away from a scoring position).
Figure 1(b) shows a slider positioned at exactly 50, worth 2 points.
(a) Initial position. (b) Positioned at 50.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a slider.
Figure 2 shows a screen of sliders as seen by the subjects. In this example, the subject has
positioned one slider at 50 and one at 49, giving a points score of 3. As the task proceeds, the
screen displays the subject's current points score and the amount of time remaining. The slider
task involves little randomness and the subject's points score gives a nely gradated measure of
performance or work output, which we term `productivity'.
2.2 Stage 1: Practice
In the rst of the three stages, subjects were given two minutes to practice the slider task (with
102 sliders) and become familiar with it. This stage was not compensated.
2.3 Stage 2: Control and bonus treatment
In the second stage, subjects were given ten minutes to achieve a points score of 40 in the slider
task (again with 102 sliders). We chose a long time limit to give the subjects more than ample
time to achieve the required score, but subjects were aware that as soon as they reached a points
score of 40 they would move on to the third and nal stage and that if they did not achieve
the score they would exit the experiment. Our experimental conditions varied how the subjects
were compensated for completing the stage.
In the `Control' condition (C), the subjects were paid a xed pre-announced amount for
completing the stage. The control subjects were split into two subgroups: in `Control 1' (C1)
subjects were paid $2 for completing the stage; in `Control 2' (C2) subjects were paid $8 for
completing the stage. In the `Treatment' condition (T), subjects were told that they would be
paid $2 for completing the stage, and that there was a 50% chance they would earn a bonus
of an additional $6 for completing stage 2, in which case they would be paid a total of $8 for
12Keyboards were disabled to prevent the subjects from using the arrow keys to position the sliders.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of Stage 3.
Note: Not all the sliders are displayed: the subject can scroll down to see more sliders.
completing the stage. The treated subjects were informed that a random number generator
would decide randomly whether or not they had earned the bonus, and that they would nd out
the outcome after completing the stage. `Treatment 1' (T1) refers to the subgroup of treated
subjects who did not receive the bonus, and who were thus paid $2 for completing the stage.
`Treatment 2' (T2) refers to the subgroup of treated subjects who did receive the bonus, and
who were thus paid a total of $8 for completing the stage. Subjects were randomly allocated to
C1, C2, T1 or T2 with equal probability.13
To summarize, we have a 2 ($2 or $8)  2 (xed payment or bonus) between-subjects design.
13When subjects logged in to start the experiment, they were randomly allocated to C1, C2 or T, with 25%
probability, 25% probability and 50% probability respectively. After completing stage 2, the subjects in T were
randomly allocated to T1 or T2 with equal probability. Of the 641 subjects who completed the experiment, 152
were in C1, 183 in C2, 164 in T1 and 142 in T2. Of the 42 subjects who logged in but failed to complete the
experiment, 11 dropped out during the practice stage before they were given any information about their payment
scheme. Of the 31 who dropped out after the practice stage, 7 were in C1, 6 in C2 and 18 in T (16 of the 18
dropped out before discovering whether they had earned the bonus or not). The attrition rate in T was not
signicantly dierent to that in C (a t-test gives a 2-sided p = 0:265 for the null that the attrition rates were the
same), and within C the attrition rate in C1 was not signicantly dierent to that in C2 (2-sided p = 0:554).
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In C1 the subjects earned $2 for sure. In C2 they earned $8 for sure. In T1 they earned $2,
but failed to receive a random bonus of $6. In T2 they earned $8, including a random bonus of
$6. The design allows us to identify the causal eects of the random bonus: in Section 3.1 we
look at the causal eect of the bonus treatment on later cheating and productivity in stage 3,
holding remuneration constant; in Section 3.2 we look at the causal eect of receiving the bonus
on cheating and productivity.
2.4 Stage 3: Cheating and productivity
The third stage is designed to measure cheating and productivity. Subjects were given ve
minutes to work on the slider task (now with 201 sliders), and were paid $0.05 for every point
they scored. In addition, we asked the subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's phone
number and told them that they would be paid an amount in pounds equal to the number that
they reported (we also gave them the option of reporting \don't know", which paid nothing).
The subjects were informed that they could report the number at any time during the ve
minutes, that they could change their report if they made a mistake, and that the report at the
end of the ve minutes would determine payos. Figure 2 provides a screenshot of this stage.
Asking the subjects to report the last digit of their best friend's number introduces an
opportunity for the subjects to cheat. By reporting a value higher than the true one, the subjects
could raise their payo without any possibility of detection. As discussed in Section 1.2, this
aspect of the experimental design provides opportunities for both `soft' and `hard' cheating, and
in so doing mimics the nature of many real-world cheating opportunities. Although we do not
know the exact distribution of the last digit of people's phone numbers, we can compare the
average number reported by subjects who were in dierent control and treatment conditions in
stage 2 to detect dierences in cheating. Given the subjects have no compelling incentive to
underreport, any increase in the average report can reasonably be interpreted as an increase in
cheating.14
3 Results
We split our analysis into three parts. First, we look at the causal eect of the bonus treatment
on later cheating and productivity. Second, we consider the causal eect of being paid a random
bonus on cheating and productivity. Finally, we see whether there is a relationship between
cheating and productivity in stage 3.
14It is possible that some subjects underreported high numbers in order to avoid any suspicion of cheating.
In common with experiments which identify cheating using reports of random outcomes such as coin ips or die
rolls where the underlying distribution is known, we cannot identify such behavior, but we nd it unlikely that it
played an important role in our experiment.
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3.1 Eect of bonus treatment on cheating and productivity
In this section, we want to discover whether subjects exposed to the random bonus treatment T
change their behavior, compared to subjects in the control C. Recall that the comparison holds
remuneration constant, as subjects in C1 are paid the same as in T1 ($2) while those in C2
are paid the same as in T2 ($8). To identify the causal eect of using random bonuses in stage
2 on cheating and productivity in stage 3, we regress three outcomes of interest on a dummy
for the bonus treatment, namely: (i) the report of the last digit of each subject's best friend's
phone number; (ii) an indicator of the report being greater than or equal to 7; and (iii) each
subject's points score in the slider task. In each case, we run the regression with and without a
male control.
Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.353 0.362 0.068 0.069 0.060 0.068
(T) [0.192] [0.190] [0.035] [0.035] [1.663] [1.642]
(0.066) (0.057) (0.052) (0.045) (0.971) (0.967)
Male - 0.537 - 0.100 - 6.980
- [0.195] - [0.035] - [1.640]
- (0.006) - (0.005) - (0.000)
Intercept 7.324 7.022 0.739 0.682 89.457 85.645
[0.141] [0.181] [0.025] [0.034] [1.216] [1.424]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582 641 641
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) We weight the data to
allow for the fact that the ratio of subjects in C1 to C2 is not exactly the same as the ratio of subjects
in T1 to T2 (see footnote 13). Table 4 in Appendix B shows that our results are robust to using the
unweighted data. (iii) The rst four columns include only the 582 subjects who reported a number.
Table 5 in Appendix B shows that our results are robust to including all 641 subjects who completed the
experiment, and so using money earned from the report as the dependent variable rather than the report
itself. The eects are slightly larger in magnitude, but not quite as precisely estimated.
Table 1: Eect of bonus treatment: OLS regressions.
Table 1 shows that the bonus treatment induces more cheating but has no eect on pro-
ductivity: subjects who have been exposed to the bonus treatment report signicantly higher
numbers on average (columns 1-2; 2-sided p = 0:057 with a male control) and are signicantly
more likely to report a number greater than or equal to 7 (columns 3-4; 2-sided p = 0:045 with a
male control), but do not work signicantly harder (columns 5-6; 2-sided p = 0:967 with a male
control). Using random bonuses increases the average report by 5% and increases the proportion
9
of subjects reporting a 7 or higher by 9%, but the increase in the average points score is less than
0.1% and not signicant.15;16 In the light of evidence that rms often use bonus-based compen-
sation that includes an important random component (see Section 1.2), this suggests that rms
ought to take into account possible unintended consequences for worker honesty when designing
bonus-based pay structures.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
Pr
op
or
tio
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Report of last digit of best friend’s phone number
Control Bonus treatment
(a) Probability mass function.
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Report of last digit of best friend’s phone number
Control Bonus treatment
(b) Cumulative distribution function.
Figure 3: Eect of bonus treatment on distribution of reported number.
Notes: The distributions are for the 582 subjects who reported a number. The data are weighted
as explained in the notes to Table 1.
15Other papers have found that productivity in the slider task can be inuenced by a variety of factors, including
the size of the incentives and the productivity of the rst-mover in a sequential tournament (Gill and Prowse,
2012), and by whether a subject won or lost in a previous round with repeated competition (Gill and Prowse,
2011a).
16The impact of the bonus treatment on cheating does not depend on whether subjects were paid $2 (C1 and
T1) or $8 (C2 and T2). When we run the regressions in columns 1-4 of Table 1 for subjects in C1 and T1 only
or for subjects in C2 and T2 only, the coecients on the treatment dummy are positive in both cases, and do not
vary signicantly when comparing that for C1 and T1 subjects to that for T2 and C2 subjects (p-values of 0.703,
0.524, 0.882 and 0.916 for columns 1-4, respectively).
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We can see visually the impact of the bonus treatment on cheating by inspecting the prob-
ability and cumulative distributions of the reported number in Figure 3. Figure 3(b) illustrates
that the cumulative distribution of the reported number for subjects who have been exposed
to the bonus treatment rst-order stochastically dominates that for subjects exposed to the
control. In Figure 3(a) we can see that about 55% of the subjects report 9, the number that
maximizes earnings: a high but incomplete rate of cheating is consistent with the existing ev-
idence on cheating more broadly (e.g., Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008). Our nding that males
cheat more (positive coecients on the male dummy in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1, signicant
at the 1% level) also matches previous ndings (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Conrads et al.,
2011; Houser et al., 2011).
3.2 Eect of receiving bonus on cheating and productivity
Next, we focus on the causal eect of receiving the random bonus on cheating and productivity.
In Section 3.1, we looked at whether subjects exposed to the bonus treatment change their
behavior, compared to the control subjects. Here we want to discover, within the subjects
exposed to the bonus treatment in stage 2, whether those who received the random bonus (T2)
change their behavior in stage 3 compared to those who did not receive the bonus (T1).
Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Received bonus 0.070 0.098 -0.022 -0.018 2.499 2.615
(T2) [0.259] [0.257] [0.048] [0.047] [2.267] [2.237]
(0.787) (0.703) (0.642) (0.705) (0.271) (0.243)
Male - 0.620 - 0.093 - 5.872
- [0.264] - [0.048] - [2.244]
- (0.020) - (0.054) - (0.009)
Intercept 7.642 7.290 0.818 0.765 88.268 85.010
[0.188] [0.252] [0.032] [0.045] [1.648] [1.898]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 280 280 280 280 306 306
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) The rst four columns
include only the 280 subjects exposed to the bonus treatment T who reported a number, while the nal
two include all 306 subjects exposed to T.
Table 2: Eect of receiving bonus: OLS regressions.
Table 2 replicates the analysis of Table 1, but using only the subjects exposed to the bonus
treatment and using the receipt of the random bonus (T2) as the treatment dummy. The
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results show that receiving the bonus has no statistically signicant eect on either cheating or
productivity. Receiving the bonus has a small positive eect on the average number reported, a
small negative eect on the proportion of subjects reporting a 7 or higher, and a small positive
eect on the average points score in the slider task, but none of the eects are close to being
signicant.17 The probability and cumulative distributions of the reported number in Figure 4
conrm visually the absence of any eect of receiving the bonus on cheating.
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Figure 4: Eect of receiving bonus on distribution of reported number.
Note: The distributions are for the 280 subjects exposed to the bonus treatment T who reported
a number.
In summary, the results presented above in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 reveal that the level of
cheating depends on whether subjects were exposed to the bonus treatment, but not on whether
they actually received the bonus. As discussed in Section 1.3, drawing on notions of procedural
fairness and existing empirical evidence, a plausible interpretation is that subjects judge the
random aspect of the bonus in the Treatment to be unjust, and reciprocate negatively in the
17We also nd that income does not aect cheating when we compare the behavior of all the subjects who
earned $2 (C1 and T1) to those who earned $8 (C2 and T2).
12
form of more dishonesty.
3.3 Relationship between cheating and productivity
Finally, we want to see whether cheating and productivity in stage 3 are related. To do so, we
regress (i) the report of the last digit of each subject's best friend's phone number and (ii) an
indicator of the report being greater than or equal to 7 on each subject's points score in the
slider task. Once again, we run the regressions with and without a male control. Table 3 shows
that the more productive subjects also cheat more: a higher points score signicantly increases
the reported number (columns 1-2; 2-sided p = 0:050 with a male control) and the probability
that a subject reports a number greater than or equal to 7 (columns 3-4; 2-sided p = 0:059
with a male control). The regression coecients imply that, on average, moving from the lowest
points score of 32 to the highest points score of 159 increases the report by 22% and increases
the probability of a subject reporting a 7 or higher by 43%.18
Reported Probability of
number report  7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Points score in 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.002
slider task [0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.017) (0.050) (0.019) (0.059)
Male - 0.461 - 0.086
- [0.200] - [0.036]
- (0.022) - (0.019)
Intercept 6.486 6.393 0.593 0.576
[0.446] [0.444] [0.080] [0.080]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582
Notes: (i) , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in parentheses. (ii) We include only the 582
subjects who reported a number. Table 6 in Appendix B shows that our results are robust to including
all 641 subjects who completed the experiement, and so using money earned from the report as the
dependent variable rather than the report itself. The eects are slightly larger in magnitude, but not
quite as precisely estimated.
Table 3: Relationship between cheating and productivity: OLS regressions.
18The relationship between cheating and productivity does not depend on whether subjects were exposed to the
bonus treatment (T) or the control (C), and nor does the relationship depend on whether subjects were paid $2
(C1 and T1) or $8 (C2 and T2). When we run the regressions in Table 3 for subjects in C only or for subjects in
T only, the coecients on the points score are positive in all cases, and do not vary signicantly when comparing
that for C subjects to that for T subjects (p-values of 0.267, 0.260, 0.294 and 0.291 for columns 1-4, respectively).
When we run the regressions for subjects in C1 and T1 only or for subjects in C2 and T2 only, the coecients
on the points score are positive in all cases, and do not vary signicantly when comparing that for C1 and T1
subjects to that for T2 and C2 subjects (p-values of 0.740, 0.670, 0.281, and 0.241 for columns 1-4, respectively).
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Our result that more productive workers cheat more is consistent with people who are more
strongly motivated by money working harder in order to earn more and also being more tempted
to cheat for personal gain. The result may also reect that subjects' self-control is eroded
by working on the real-eort task. Alternatively, hard-working subjects may have felt that
they deserved more for their labor. Further discussion of these mechanisms can be found in
Section 1.3.
4 Conclusion
Despite their importance, employee cheating and crime have received insucient attention by
economists. Our analysis contributes to a burgeoning literature that examines the interaction
between compensation schemes and cheating in the workplace, and we are the rst to investigate
a link between productivity and dishonesty. Our ndings suggest that workers perceive exposure
to random bonuses as unfair, providing a justication for negative reciprocity in the form of
increased cheating. Thus, bonus-based compensation may have important unintended side-
eects that have not been highlighted in the existing literature, which has instead focused on
the incentive eects of bonuses. Complementary eld evidence and replication of our novel
experimental ndings in laboratory studies would be of particular value to determine the degree
to which our results extend to dierent work tasks and to bonus schemes used in practice.
Appendix
A Experimental instructions
Log In
You are being asked to take part in an experiment on economic decision-making. The experiment
will last about 20 to 25 minutes. We are very grateful for your participation. You will be paid
a participation fee of $3 for completing the experiment. You will also have the opportunity to
earn additional money. Your earnings today will depend on your own actions and some element
of chance. Further details will be provided during the experiment. You will be able to come
to Room 3115 in Building 58 (Murray Building - Higheld Campus) between 9am and 6pm on
Thursday 26 May or Wednesday 1 June to collect your payment for the experiment. You will be
paid in cash. If you cannot come on one of these days, please do not participate. Please complete
the experiment on a desktop or laptop computer. Tablet computers, iPads, iPhones etc. will
not work properly. You must not press any of your browser buttons (e.g., stop, refresh, reload,
back, forward) at any time. If you do so, you will exit the experiment and you will not be paid
anything. Please do not use your keyboard: use only your mouse or touchpad. Once you log in
to start the experiment, you must complete it in one go. If you leave the experiment, you cannot
return and you will not be paid anything. You have the right to withdraw from the experiment
14
at any time. If you withdraw from the experiment, you will not be paid anything. If you have
a technical problem during the experiment please contact: jy2e08@ecs.soton.ac.uk. If you have
forgotten your password, or for any other query, please contact: jy2e08@ecs.soton.ac.uk. If
you wish to participate now, please enter your username and password below. [Box to enter
previously provided username and password] Note, if you have trouble logging in using Firefox,
please follow the troubleshoot [Web link]. Alternatively, you can use the Google Chrome browser
or use a computer in the computing room at the Hartley Library.
Instructions - General Overview
You must not press any of your browser buttons (e.g., stop, refresh, reload, back, forward) at
any time. If you do so, you will exit the experiment and you will not be paid anything. Please
do not use your keyboard: use only your mouse or touchpad. The experiment will consist of 3
stages. At the start of each stage, you will receive instructions about that stage. What you do
in stage 1 will not aect what happens in stages 2 and 3, and what you do in stage 2 will not
aect what happens in stage 3. As is the case in all economics experiments, we will not deceive
you in any way during the experiment. In particular, this means that we will not give you any
false information at any time during the experiment. [\Proceed" button] Button will enable in
50 seconds. Once the button is enabled, please press it to proceed when you are ready.
Instructions - The Task
In each stage you will have the opportunity to attempt a computerised task. The task will
consist of a screen with a large number of sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and
can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position.
You can use your mouse or touchpad in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. All the sliders will be on one page, but
you may need to scroll down the page to see them all. You will receive 2 points for each slider
that you position at exactly 50. You will receive 1 point for each slider that you position at
exactly 49 or 51. Your \points score" in the task will be your total number of points. During
the task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen, including the
time remaining and your points score in the task so far. [\Proceed" button] Button will enable
in 90 seconds
Stage 1 out of 3: Instructions
In stage 1 you will have 2 minutes to practice the task. The purpose of this stage is purely to
allow you to practice the task. Therefore, you will not be paid for this stage. [\Start Practice"
button] Button will enable in 20 seconds
Stage 2 out of 3: Instructions
To complete stage 2 you must reach a points score of 40 in the task within 10 minutes. As soon
as you reach a points score of 40 you will proceed immediately to the next screen. fC1: You
will be paid $2 for completing stage 2.g fC2: You will be paid $8 for completing stage 2.g fT1
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and T2: You will be paid $2 for completing stage 2. There is also a 50% chance that you will
earn a bonus of an additional $6 for completing stage 2. If you earn the bonus, you will thus be
paid a total of $8 = $2 + $6 for completing the stage. A computer will use a random number
generator to decide randomly whether or not you have earned the bonus for completing stage 2.
You will nd out whether you have earned the bonus only after completing the stage.g If you
fail to complete stage 2 within 10 minutes you will leave the experiment automatically and you
will not be paid anything. [\Start Stage 2" button] Button will enable in 90 seconds
Stage 2 out of 3: Summary of payment
fC1: Your payment for completing stage 2 is $2.g fC2: Your payment for completing stage
2 is $8.g fT1: Remember that there was a 50% chance that you would earn a bonus of $6
for completing stage 2. You did not earn the bonus. Your payment for completing stage 2
is $2.gfT2: Remember that there was a 50% chance that you would earn a bonus of $6 for
completing stage 2. You did earn the bonus. Your payment for completing stage 2 is $8.g
[\Proceed" button] Button will enable in 45 seconds
Stage 3 out of 3: Instructions
In stage 3 you will have the opportunity to attempt the task for a period of 5 minutes. You will
be paid according to your points score at the end of the 5 minutes. In particular, you will be
paid 5 pence for every point you score. You will also be asked to report the last digit of your
best friend's phone number, i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9. In addition to the payment for
your points score in the task, you will be paid an amount in pounds equal to the number that
you report. Therefore, for every increase of 1 in the number that you report, your payment for
stage 3 will go up by $1. You can report the last digit of your best friend's phone number at
any time during the 5 minutes for this stage. If you make a mistake, you can change your report
during the 5 minutes. At the end of the 5 minutes your report will be nal. If you do not know
or cannot nd your best friend's phone number, please select the \don't know" option. Your
payment for stage 3 will then depend only on your points score in the task. [\Start Stage 3"
button] Button will enable in 90 seconds
B Robustness
We collect here three tables that are referred to in the notes to Tables 1 and 3 as providing
robustness checks.
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Reported Proportion of Points score in
number reports  7 slider task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated 0.354 0.364 0.069 0.071 -0.160 -0.114
(T) [0.192] [0.191] [0.035] [0.034] [1.667] [1.645]
(0.066) (0.057) (0.048) (0.041) (0.924) (0.945)
Male - 0.535 - 0.099 - 7.031
- [0.195] - [0.035] - [1.638]
- (0.006) - (0.005) - (0.000)
Intercept 7.321 7.018 0.738 0.682 89.588 85.706
[0.141] [0.180] [0.025] [0.034] [1.214] [1.418]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 582 582 582 582 641 641
Notes: All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are in
parentheses.
Table 4: Robustness (Table 1): unweighted data.
Earnings from Proportion of earnings
report (in pounds) from report  $7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.413 0.414 0.071 0.071
(T) [0.243] [0.242] [0.036] [0.036]
(0.089) (0.087) (0.050) (0.049)
Male - 0.682 - 0.111
- [0.245] - [0.036]
- (0.006) - (0.003)
Intercept 6.619 6.247 0.668 0.607
[0.174] [0.226] [0.026] [0.034]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 641 641 641 641
Notes: (i) All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are
in parentheses. (ii) Since we include the subjects who did not report a number, the dependent variable
is money earned from the report rather than the report itself.
Table 5: Robustness (columns 1-4 of Table 1): all 641 subjects.
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Earnings from Probability of earnings
report (in pounds) from report  $7
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Points score in 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.002
slider task [0.006] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001]
(0.035) (0.093) (0.020) (0.064)
Male - 0.614 - 0.098
- [0.252] - [0.037]
- (0.015) - (0.009)
Intercept 5.684 5.561 0.518 0.498
[0.554] [0.551] [0.081] [0.081]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs. 641 641 641 641
Notes: (i) All results are from OLS regressions. , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. 2-sided p-values are
in parentheses. (ii) Since we include the subjects who did not report a number, the dependent variable
is money earned from the report rather than the report itself.
Table 6: Robustness (Table 3): all 641 subjects.
References
Abdolmohammadi, M.J. andBaker, C.R. (2007). The relationship between moral reasoning
and plagiarism in accounting courses: A replication study. Issues in Accounting Education,
22(1): 45{55
Abeler, J., Becker, A., and Falk, A. (2012). Truth-telling { A representative assessment.
Mimeo, University of Oxford
ACFE (2012). Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse: 2012 Global Fraud
Study. Association of Certied Fraud Examiners, TX: Austin
Bertrand, M. andMullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without
principals are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3): 901{932
Bhattacherjee, D. (2005). The eects of group incentives in an Indian rm: Evidence from
payroll data. Labour, 19(1): 147{173
Bonein, A. and Denant-Boemont, L. (2011). Temptation, commitment and peer pressure:
A laboratory experiment. Mimeo, University of Rennes
Bucciol, A. and Piovesan, M. (2011). Luck or cheating? A eld experiment on honesty with
children. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(1): 73{78
Burns, N. and Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on misre-
porting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1): 35{67
Cadsby, C.B., Song, F., and Tapon, F. (2010). Are you paying your employees to cheat?
An experimental investigation. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 10(1): Article
35
Cettolin, E. and Riedl, A. (2011). Fairness and uncertainty. Mimeo, Maastricht University
Charness, G. and Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74(6):
1579{1601
Charness, G. and Garoupa, N. (2000). Reputation, honesty, and eciency with insider
information: An experiment. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(3): 425{451
Charness, G. and Levine, D.I. (2007). Intention and stochastic outcomes: An experimental
study. Economic Journal, 117(522): 1051{1072
Chen, C.X. and Sandino, T. (forthcoming). Can wages buy honesty? The relationship
18
between relative wages and employee theft. Journal of Accounting Research
Chow, C.W., Hirst, M.K., and Shields, M.D. (1994). Motivating truthful subordinate
reporting: An experimental investigation in a two-subordinate context. Contemporary Ac-
counting Research, 10(2): 699{720
Cojoc, D. and Stoian, A. (2012). Dishonesty and charitable behavior. Mimeo, University of
Iowa
Conrads, J., Irlenbusch, B., Rilke, R.M., and Walkowitz, G. (2011). Lying and team
incentives. IZA Discussion Paper 5968
Core, J.E. and Guay, W.R. (2001). Stock option plans for non-executive employees. Journal
of Financial Economics, 61(2): 253{287
Coricelli, G., Joly, M., Montmarquette, C., and Villeval, M.C. (2010). Cheating,
emotions, and rationality: An experiment on tax evasion. Experimental Economics, 13(2):
226{247
Croson, R., Boles, T., and Murnighan, J. (2003). Cheap talk in bargaining experiments:
lying and threats in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 51(2):
143{159
Curry, P.A. andMongrain, S. (2009). Deterrence in rank-order tournaments. Review of Law
& Economics, 5(1): 723{740
Dickens, W.T., Katz, L.F., Lang, K., and Summers, L.H. (1989). Employee crime and
the monitoring puzzle. Journal of Labor Economics, 7(3): 331{347
Djawadi, B.M. and Fahr, R. (2012). The impact of tax knowledge and budget spending
inuence on tax compliance. Mimeo, University of Paderborn
Dreber, A. and Johannesson, M. (2008). Gender dierences in deception. Economics Letters,
99(1): 197{199
Eacret, N.D., Laerty, N.C., and Jhunjhunwala, T. (2011). When is inequality fair?
Mimeo, University of Texas at Dallas
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., and Swanson, E. (2007). Why do corporate managers misstate
nancial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors. Journal of Financial
Economics, 85(3): 667{708
Eisenberger, R. and Shank, D.M. (1985). Personal work ethic and eort training aect
cheating. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(2): 520{528
Eisenkopf, G., Gurtoviy, R., and Utikal, V. (2011). Size matters - when it comes to lies.
IAAEG Discussion Paper 02/2011
Evans III, J.H., Hannan, R.L., Krishnan, R., and Moser, D.V. (2001). Honesty in
managerial reporting. Accounting Review, 76(4): 537{559
Fischbacher, U. and Heusi, F. (2008). Lies in disguise: An experimental study on cheating.
TWI Research Paper 40
Fischbacher, U. and Utikal, V. (2011). Disadvantageous lies. TWI Research Paper 71
Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2011a). Gender dierences and dynamics in competition: The role
of luck. Department of Economics Discussion Paper 564, University of Oxford
Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2011b). A novel computerized real eort task based on sliders. IZA
Discussion Paper 5801
Gill, D. and Prowse, V. (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real
eort competition. American Economic Review, 102(1): 469{503
Gilpatric, S.M. (2011). Cheating in contests. Economic Inquiry, 49(4): 1042{1053
Gino, F., Schweitzer, M.E., Mead, N.L., and Ariely, D. (2011). Unable to resist temp-
tation: How self-control depletion promotes unethical behavior. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 115(2): 191{203
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review, 95(1):
384{394
Greenberg, J. (1990). Employee theft as a reaction to underpayment inequity: The hidden
cost of pay cuts. Journal of Applied Psychology, 75(5): 561{568
Grover, S.L. (1993). Lying, deceit, and subterfuge: A model of dishonesty in the workplace.
Organization Science, 478{495
Hall, B.J. and Liebman, J.B. (1998). Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(3): 653{691
Hammermann, A.,Mohnen, A., and Nieken, P. (2011). Whom to choose as a team mate?
A lab experiment about in-group favouritism. IZA Discussion Paper 6286
Hansen, D. (1997). Worker performance and group incentives: A case study. Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, 51(1): 37{49
Hao, L. and Houser, D. (2011). Honest lies. ICES Discussion Paper 2011-03, George Mason
19
University
Hetzel, S. (2010). The impact of nancial incentives on individual performance: An experi-
mental approach. Diplomarbeit, University of Mannheim
Houser, D., Vetter, S., and Winter, J. (2011). Fairness and cheating. ICES Discussion
Paper 2011-01, George Mason University
Jacob, B.A. and Levitt, S.D. (2003). Rotten apples: An investigation of the prevalence and
predictors of teacher cheating. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(3): 843{877
Kaur, S., Kremer, M., andMullainathan, S. (2011). Self-control at work. Mimeo, Harvard
University
Knez, M. and Simester, D. (2001). Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at Conti-
nental Airlines. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(4): 743{772
Konow, J. (2003). Which is the fairest one of all? A positive analysis of justice theories.
Journal of economic literature, 41(4): 1188{1239
Lammers, J., Stapel, D., and Galinsky, A. (2010). Power increases hypocrisy. Psychological
Science, 21(5): 737{744
Lazear, E.P. and Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts.
Journal of Political Economy, 89(5): 841{864
Lewis, A., Bardis, A., Flint, C., Mason, C., Smith, N., Tickle, C., and Zinser, J.
(2012). Drawing the line somewhere: An experimental study of moral compromise. Journal
of Economic Psychology, 33(4): 718{725
Lundquist, T., Ellingsen, T., Gribbe, E., and Johannesson, M. (2009). The aversion to
lying. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1-2): 81{92
Matuszewski, L.J. (2010). Honesty in managerial reporting: Is it aected by perceptions of
horizontal equity? Journal of Management Accounting Research, 22(1): 233{250
Mazar, N., Amir, O., and Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of
self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45(6): 633{644
Mead, N.L., Baumeister, R.F., Gino, F., Schweitzer, M.E., and Ariely, D. (2009). Too
tired to tell the truth: Self-control resource depletion and dishonesty. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 45(3): 594{597
Moers, F. (2005). Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and
subjectivity. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30(1): 67{80
Monahan, J. (2012). We're all Lockeans now: A test of the prevalence of just-desert consider-
ations in a dictator game experiment. M.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford
Nagin, D.S., Rebitzer, J.B., Sanders, S., and Taylor, L.J. (2002). Monitoring, motivation,
and management: The determinants of opportunistic behavior in a eld experiment. American
Economic Review, 92(4): 850{873
Oyer, P. (2004). Why do rms use incentives that have no incentive eects? Journal of
Finance, 59(4): 1619{1650
Oyer, P. and Schaefer, S. (2005). Why do some rms give stock options to all employees?: An
empirical examination of alternative theories. Journal of nancial Economics, 76(1): 99{133
Riener, G. and Wiederhold, S. (2011). On social identity, subjective expectations, and the
costs of control. Jena Economic Research Paper 2011{035
Schwieren, C. and Weichselbaumer, D. (2010). Does competition enhance performance or
cheating? A laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(3): 241{253
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M.J.J., and De Dreu, C.K.W. (2011). Justied ethical-
ity: Observing desired counterfactuals modies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2): 181{190
Shalvi, S., Eldar, O., and Bereby-Meyer, Y. (forthcoming). Honesty requires time (and
lack of justications). Psychological Science
Suri, S., Goldstein, D.G., and Mason, W.A. (2011). Honesty in an online labor market.
Human Computation: Papers from the 2011 AAAI Workshop (WS-11-11)
Trautmann, S.T. (2009). A tractable model of process fairness under risk. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 30(5): 803{813
Waller, W.S. and Bishop, R.A. (1990). An experimental study of incentive pay schemes,
communication, and intrarm resource allocation. Accounting Review, 65(4): 812{836
Wang, J.T., Spezio, M., and Camerer, C.F. (2010). Pinocchio's pupil: Using eyetrack-
ing and pupil dilation to understand truth telling and deception in sender-receiver games.
American Economic Review, 100(3): 984{1007
Zhang, Y. (2008). The eects of perceived fairness and communication on honesty and collusion
in a multi-agent setting. Accounting Review, 83(4): 1125{1146
20
